Uber, Lyft, and Regulating the Sharing Economy
Brett Harris*
The “sharing economy” goes by many names such as the “gig
economy,” the “1099 economy,” and the “on-demand economy,”1 all of
which describe the economic system that uses online platforms to connect
workers and sellers with clients and consumers, primarily through
smartphone applications.2 Many of the sharing economy companies are
also called the “tech disruptors.”3 They earned this title because they have
changed the way that people do business.4 But in changing the way that
people do business, they have also created unique regulatory challenges
for governments across the country. The news is rife with stories about
when these regulations go wrong. For example, tenants have been evicted
from their apartments in many cities for renting their apartments through
the “home sharing” company Airbnb.5 Another example is the standoff
between Uber and Lyft against the City of Austin over a law requiring
drivers to pass a background check before they can operate in the city,
resulting in Uber and Lyft ceasing operations in Austin and costing 10,000
drivers their jobs.6 In response to these stories, some governments have
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begun experimenting with innovative solutions to the unique regulatory
challenges created by the sharing economy.
One solution that stands out is the ordinance adopted by the City of
Seattle.7 Seattle’s ordinance created a system that allows Uber and Lyft
drivers to create a union to collectively bargain with their “driver
coordinators.”8 Seattle’s ordinance is an innovative attempt to solve the
problem of how to classify sharing economy workers, which has plagued
local governments and courts across the country.9 Companies like Uber
claim that the workers who use their platforms are “independent
contractors” rather than employees.10 By being classified as independent
contractors, workers lose many of the rights and privileges that employees
have, including the right to form unions and collectively bargain without
risk of federal antitrust liability.11 While many local governments have
attempted to challenge the way Uber classifies its workers directly,
Seattle’s ordinance is unique in that it bypasses the issue of classification
by allowing drivers to collectively bargain regardless of their worker
status.12 However, it is possible that Seattle’s ordinance itself violates
federal antitrust law. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has already sued on
behalf of Uber in federal district court, but the case was dismissed without
prejudice for lack of standing.13 Proponents of the ordinance say that it is
protected under state action immunity, which recognizes that action is
permissible despite violating federal antitrust law if it is in pursuit of a
specific state policy.14 However, to date, the Washington legislature has
made no effort to support Seattle’s unique ordinance.
This Note will explore the labor issues presented by the sharing
economy before taking a deeper look into the terms and viability of
Seattle’s innovative ordinance. Section I of this Note will provide an
overview of the sharing economy and labor relations within the sharing
economy. Section II will explore some of the ways in which Uber’s worker
classification has been challenged throughout the country, focusing
primarily on the class action lawsuit Uber settled in 2016.15 Section III will
discuss the specifics of Seattle’s ordinance and the challenges to the
ordinance raised by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Finally, Section IV
7. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6.310.735 (2015).
8. Id.
9. Kennedy, supra note 1.
10. See infra pp. 7–10.
11. Kennedy, supra note 1.
12. Id.
13. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 58 F. Supp. 3d 989 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (order granting motion
to dismiss).
14. See infra pp. 15–20.
15. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
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will discuss the state action doctrine as a defense to federal antitrust law
before determining whether the ordinance would survive federal antitrust
scrutiny under the state action doctrine. Ultimately, this Note will
conclude that Seattle’s ordinance, as written, would not survive an
antitrust challenge under the state action doctrine.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE SHARING ECONOMY AND LABOR RELATIONS

The most widely recognized sharing economy companies are the
“ride share” companies, such as Uber and Lyft. However, there are many
other sharing economy companies, such as Airbnb, Postmates, Etsy, and
even Ebay.16 Although sharing economy companies are relatively new, the
global market for sharing economy companies is growing at an extremely
fast rate.17 For example, the number of Uber drivers doubled every six
months between 2013 and 2015.18 In 2013, the global sharing economy
market was valued at $26 billion, and it is expected to grow to $110 billion
in the near future.19
Much of the sharing economy’s success can be attributed to the
consumers and the workers. Consumers cite ease of use, convenience, and
competitive pricing as reasons why they choose to do business with
sharing economy companies.20 Workers, on the other hand, are attracted
to the compensation and flexible schedules that sharing economy
companies advertise to potential workers.21
On the surface, the sharing economy seems great for everyone
involved. A quick Google search shows Lyft boasting that drivers can
make as much as $35 an hour.22 Further, Uber’s website advertises
potential income and flexible schedules as reasons for drivers to “partner”
with Uber.23 Yet, it has become increasingly clear that the realities

16. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 992.
17. REBECCA SMITH & SARAH LEBERSTEIN, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, RIGHTS ON DEMAND:
ENSURING WORKPLACE STANDARDS AND WORKER SECURITY IN THE ON-DEMAND ECONOMY 6
(2015) [hereinafter RIGHTS ON DEMAND], http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Rights-On-DemandReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6U8-JXWA].
18. Id. Another example is that Postmates grew from making 500,000 food deliveries to 1.5
million in the span of thirty weeks from 2014 to 2015. Id.
19. Id.
20. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 992–93.
21. Jonathan V. Hall & Alan B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s DriverPartners in the United States, Jan. 22, 2015, at 2, (Princeton Univ. Indust. Relations Section, Working
Paper No. 587.2015) [hereinafter Labor Market Analysis] https://irs.princeton.edu/sites/irs/files/
An%20Analysis%20of%20the%20Labor%20Market%20for%20Uber’s%20Driver-Partners%20in%
20the%20United%20States%20587.pdf [https://perma.cc/HH4A-PYK3].
22. DRIVE WITH LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/drive-with-lyft [https://perma.cc/8D9R-PSAB].
23. DRIVE, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/ [https://perma.cc/TPC7-U7WY].
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experienced by sharing economy workers are vastly different from what
the companies advertise.24
To begin, many sharing economy workers find that the compensation
is not as good as advertised because of the unpaid time spent waiting for
“jobs” from the platform and business expenses that are not covered by
the platform.25 For example, between the time lost waiting for and picking
up a rider, vehicle maintenance costs, insurance fees, and gas expenses,
Uber drivers are making less than minimum wage in many cities.26 As one
Uber driver put it, “[after driving 10 minutes to pick up a fare, spending 5
to 10 minutes waiting for the passenger, and a 10-minute ride] ‘before car
depreciation and insurance, I end up with $3.60 from [a fare of] $8. If we
look at it by hour, that will be $7.20.’”27 In addition, the companies take a
cut from each fare, further decreasing the amount that a worker will take
home at the end of the day.28
Many sharing economy workers also find that other promises made
to them are not realized. First, workers find that their schedules are not as
flexible as the companies advertise.29 While the workers can theoretically
work whenever they want, many of the companies find ways to incentivize
workers to work at certain times.30 For example, Uber increases its fares
during times of high demand in a practice that is called “surge pricing.”31
Second, because of the compensation issues listed above, sharing
economy workers often must put in long hours that extend beyond the
standard eight-hour workday in order to make a sufficient amount of
money.32 Finally, some sharing economy companies have implemented
ways to penalize workers who do not work for the platform often enough.33

24. See RIGHTS ON DEMAND, supra note 17, at 5.
25. Id.
26. Id. In Seattle, where the minimum wage is $15 per hour, Uber drivers are making $10.54 an
hour on average before other expenses. For more examples, see How Much Do Uber Drivers Actually
Make? [The Inside Scoop], RIDESTER.COM, http://uberdriverdiaries.com/how-much-do-uber-driversreally-make/ [https://perma.cc/7WRJ-DA78].
27. RIGHTS ON DEMAND, supra note 17, at 6.
28. The fact that the platform takes a cut from the worker’s income per job could be considered
an expected expense considering the platform is providing the job; however, the percentage that the
companies choose to take varies greatly. For example, Uber takes 20% per trip across most of the
United States, while Airbnb only takes 3% per night. How Much Do Uber Drivers Actually Make?
[The Inside Scoop], supra note 26.
29. RIGHTS ON DEMAND, supra note 17, at 6.
30. Id.
31. How Surge Pricing Works, UBER, https://www.uber.com/info/how-surge-works/ [https://
perma.cc/N8HD-4YN4].
32. RIGHTS ON DEMAND, supra note 17, at 6.
33. Id.
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For example, Uber may unilaterally terminate a driver’s account if the
driver has not accepted enough rides.34
Many of the sharing economy workers’ problems stem from the fact
that the companies classify the workers as “independent contractors”
rather than employees.35 Under federal labor law, employers generally
have considerable incentive to classify workers as independent
contractors, while the workers lose certain labor rights as a result.36 From
a purely financial standpoint, companies benefit from classifying workers
as independent contractors because independent contractors have no
statutory right to minimum wage, overtime pay, compensation for injuries
sustained on the job, and unemployment insurance.37 Independent
contractors are also not protected by federal labor and employment laws
that impose legal obligations on the employer, such as the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the Age Discrimination Act, and the Americans with Disabilities
Act.38 Finally, independent contractors have no federally protected right to
form unions and collectively bargain with their employers; thus,
independent contractors are denied one of the key powers that workers
have to address issues with their employers.39 In the sharing economy, the
disadvantages workers face by being classified as independent contractors
are exacerbated by the fact that sharing economy workers frequently
perform jobs in isolation from one another. As a result, they are unable to
share concerns with other workers or address issues with supervisors faceto-face, like they could in a more tradition brick-and-mortar workplace.40
34. Id. When O’Connor was settled, Uber agreed to only terminate drivers for “just cause” in the
future. See infra p. 10.
35. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 996–97; see also RIGHTS ON DEMAND, supra note 17, at 4.
36. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 996–97. From a policy perspective, independent contractors do
not have the same benefits as employees because they are presumed to have the economic, professional, and individual power to negotiate the terms and conditions of their work. Id. at 12. Examples
of independent contractors that fall into this category include lawyers, doctors, architects, and insurance agents. Id. Workers from these fields come from stronger educational backgrounds and have a
higher median annual income than the average worker; thus, it makes sense that they would have more
bargaining power than the average worker. Id. However, in reality, independent contractors come from
much more diverse economic and educational backgrounds; examples of occupations where workers
are frequently considered independent contractors include barbers, landscapers, and traditional taxi
drivers. Annette Bernhardt, Labor Standards and Reorganization of Work: Gaps in Data and Research
7 (Inst. for Res. on Lab. & Emp., Working Paper No. 100-14, 2014), http://irle.berkeley.edu/files/2014/Labor-Standards-and-the-Reorganization-of-Work.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AJD9H6D5]. For these kinds of workers, being classified as an independent contractor can mean poverty
wages, unsafe workplaces, and wage and employment instability. Id.
37. RIGHTS ON DEMAND, supra note 17, at 4.
38. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 999.
39. RIGHTS ON DEMAND, supra note 17, at 4.
40. There are websites, like coworker.org, that provide a forum for sharing economy workers to
take collective action by signing petitions; however, they are still in their infancy and do not seem to
have made a major impact to date. Id. at 6. Additionally, a Google search will reveal numerous blogs
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In short, sharing economy workers lose many labor rights by being
classified as independent contractors, while also lacking economic power
to bargain with the platforms through which they operate.
II.

CHALLENGES TO SHARING ECONOMY WORKER CLASSIFICATION

With the problems faced by sharing economy workers becoming
increasingly apparent to legislatures, state and local governments across
the United States have attempted to find solutions to the worker
classification issue.41 Facing regulation, sharing economy companies often
default to the argument that they are not employers because they are
merely offering an online platform that connects workers—or independent
entrepreneurs—to consumers.42 Critics of this argument point out that the
sharing economy companies still manage their workers as if they were
employees in various ways, such as unilaterally setting rates for services;
dictating how the services are provided; and screening, testing, training,
evaluating, promoting, and disciplining the workers based on standards set
by the companies.43
Despite pushback from the sharing economy companies, local
governments have successfully regulated in favor of the workers in a
where sharing economy workers can voice their concerns, but these also do not seem to have had any
impact on how the workers communicate with the sharing economy companies themselves.
41. For a more detailed overview of regulatory issues presented by the sharing economy, see for
example Bryant Cannon & Hanna Chung, A Framework for Designing Co-Regulation Models WellAdapted to Technology-Facilitated Sharing Economies, 31 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 23 (2015)
[hereinafter Designing Co-Regulation Models].
42. RIGHTS ON DEMAND, supra note 17, at 1.
43. Id. at 4. Interestingly, some analysts have begun categorizing the sharing economy companies in two distinct groups: “labor platforms” and “capital platforms.” FARRELL & GREIG, supra note
2, at 20. Labor platforms consist of companies that connect freelance or contingent workers with consumers in order to complete discrete tasks or projects. Id. Examples of labor platform companies under
this definition are Uber and Postmates. Id. Capital platforms, on the other hand, connect customers
with individuals who rent assets or sell goods peer-to-peer. Id. Examples of capital platform companies
under this definition are Airbnb and eBay. Id. If nothing else, these classifications show that not all
sharing economy companies can be treated the same. For example, if the policy behind why independent contractors are not afforded the same benefits as employees is applied to a labor platform worker,
such as an Uber driver, and a capital platform worker, such as an Airbnb host, the difference between
the workers becomes clear. See AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com [https://perma.cc/2WUT-2L2U]. In
the case of the Airbnb host, the host has the economic and personal bargaining power that an independent contractor is presumed to have because he has sufficient resources to either own a home that
is large enough that extra space can be rented out or he owns an extra home that can be rented out
altogether. Moreover, Airbnb gives its hosts more freedom to directly set their prices and schedules.
Id. The Uber driver, on the other hand, is only required to have insurance and possibly a vehicle, and
has little to no control over where his rides are picked up and dropped off and how much the riders are
charged. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 997–98. Thus, from a worker classification standpoint, labor platform workers, like Uber drivers, are much more detrimentally affected by being classified as independent contractors than capital platform counterparts, such as Airbnb hosts, who are more like true
independent contractors.
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handful of situations. For example, the Florida Department of Economic
Opportunity found that an Uber driver was eligible for unemployment
insurance as an employee of Uber.44 Similarly, the California Labor
Commission found that an Uber driver was entitled to reimbursement for
certain expenses incurred while driving for Uber because he was an
employee and not an independent contractor.45 However, these examples
are relatively small, localized successes for individual Uber drivers
challenging their worker classification compared to the class action case
Uber settled in April 2016.
In 2013, Uber drivers filed a class action law suit in federal district
court for the Northern District of California alleging that they had been
misclassified as independent contractors by Uber.46 In standard class
action fashion, Uber responded with a motion to dismiss, asserting that it
is a “technology company” rather than a “transportation company”; thus,
the drivers are, in fact, independent contractors using Uber’s services to
contact riders.47 Judge Edward M. Chen denied Uber’s motion on March
11, 2015, holding “that whether an individual should ultimately be
classified as an employee or an independent contractor under California
law presents a mixed question of law and fact that must typically be
resolved by a jury.”48
Nevertheless, Judge Chen still discussed the merits of the case at
some length, poking holes in much of Uber’s argument that it is merely a
technology company and finding that Uber’s argument was “fatally flawed
in numerous respects.”49 To begin, the court found that simply because
Uber is a “technologically advanced transportation company,” does not
make it a technology company.50 The court elaborated: “Uber is no more
a ‘technology company’ than Yellow Cab is a ‘technology company’
because it uses CB radios to dispatch taxi cabs.”51 The court also
determined that Uber would not be a viable business entity without its
drivers because it depends on revenue generated from rides given by its
drivers and not revenue from software sales.52 Finally, the court found that
Uber exercises a significant amount of control over its drivers by
unilaterally setting the rates it charges its riders, by requiring potential
44. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1004.
45. Id. at 1004–05.
46. Id. at 1005.
47. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (order granting motion
to dismiss).
48. Id. at 1135.
49. Id. at 1141.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1142.
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drivers to meet certain qualifications before they can work for Uber, and
by reserving the right to terminate drivers’ accounts.53
Despite the court’s strongly worded opinion denying the motion to
dismiss, the question of whether Uber drivers are employees or
independent contractors was ultimately left to be determined by a jury.54
In April 2016, with the trial only a month away, the Ninth Circuit granted
Uber’s request for an emergency appeal of the district court’s finding that
Uber’s binding arbitration clause was unenforceable.55 At this point, the
combination of the concerns that the drivers would lose their class
certification and that a jury might find that Uber drivers are independent
contractors, especially with Uber having the home field advantage in San
Francisco, led the parties to settle.56 Uber made some major concessions
to the drivers in the settlement, including a $100 million settlement to be
split among 340,000 drivers in California and Massachusetts, agreeing to
meet with a “Driver Association” once a quarter, agreeing to no longer
deactivate drivers’ accounts without just cause, and permitting drivers to
collect tips.57 Nevertheless, the drivers ultimately agreed to continue being
classified as independent contractors, and the issue was never addressed
in a federal court.58
In the aftermath of the settlement, drivers in New York City formed
an “Independent Driver’s Guild.”59 Although the guild does not afford the
drivers the same collective bargaining rights as an official labor union—
such as bargaining over fares, commissions, and benefits—Uber agreed to
support and work with the guild to quell some of the driver unrest.60
III.

SEATTLE’S INNOVATIVE ORDINANCE
A.

Terms of the Ordinance

While the class action lawsuit was still pending, the Seattle City
Council passed a unique ordinance allowing Uber drivers to collectively
bargain regardless of their classification, effectively avoiding the worker
classification issues.61 In December 2015, the Seattle City Council adopted
Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 6.310, which provides a framework for
53. Id. at 1142–43.
54. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1006.
55. Id. at 1007.
56. Id.
57. Id. 1007–08.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Douglas MacMillan, Uber Agrees to Work With a Guild for Its Drivers in New York City,
WALL ST. J. (May 10, 2016 4:54 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-agrees-to-work-with-aguild-for-its-drivers-in-new-york-city-1462913669.
61. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1010.
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drivers to form a union, or an “exclusive driver representative” (EDR).62
Although SMC 6.310 was clearly adopted in response to the sharing
economy ride sharing companies, or “transport network companies”
(TNC)—like Uber and Lyft—the Code extends to all “driver
coordinators” in the city of Seattle, including taxicab associations and forhire vehicle companies.63
Under the ordinance, an entity must go through a somewhat
complicated process before it can be established as an EDR. To begin, an
entity must seek designation as a “qualified driver representative” (QDR)
from Seattle’s Director of Finance and Administrative Services
(Director).64 The designation of QDR status is subject to three conditions:
(1) The entity must be registered as a nonprofit entity with the Washington
Secretary of State; (2) the entity’s bylaws must give drivers the right to be
members of the organization and participate in democratic control of the
organization; and (3) the entity must have experience in assisting
steakholders in reaching consensus agreements with employers and
contractors, a demonstrated commitment to assisting stakeholders in
reaching consensus agreements with employers and contractors, or both.65
A QDR can then move to be certified as an EDR by the Director upon
showing that it has the support, in the form of a physical or electronic
signature, from a majority of “qualified drivers” with a particular driver
coordinator.66
Although there could be multiple QDRs, the EDR would represent
all drivers for a particular driver coordinator once the EDR is designated.67
Under the ordinance, the EDR will have the power to meet and negotiate
62. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6.310.735 (2015). The new ordinance is not Seattle’s first
attempt at regulating the ride-sharing companies. When Uber and Lyft were first permitted to operate
in Seattle in 2014, the city passed regulations limiting the total number of vehicles that could be operating for either company to 150. Designing Co-Regulation Models, supra note 41, at 43; Mike
O’Brien, A New Law is Letting Uber Drivers Unionize, NATION (July 1, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/a-new-law-is-letting-uber-drivers-unionize/ [https://perma.cc/3RSA-BM5J]. At that
time, however,the ride share companies were seen as a needed transportation service that allowed
drivers to make money outside of the rigid regulations of the taxi industry. Id. As a result, Uber was
able to bolster enough user support to get the regulation overturned within three months. Davey Alba,
Inside Seattle’s Bold Plan to Let Its Uber Drivers Organize, WIRED (Dec. 14, 2015),
https://www.wired.com/2015/12/inside-seattles-bold-plan-to-let-its-uber-drivers-organize/ [https://
perma.cc/8CKW-HVXQ]. Nevertheless, in the time between 2014 and when the new ordinance was
adopted in December 2015, the public perception of the ride share companies began to shift. In the
words of Seattle City Councilmember Mike O’Brien, “[t]he companies, once seen as upstart innovators, came to be seen as major corporations intent on asserting power to the detriment of workers.”
O’Brien, supra note 62.
63. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6.310.110 (2016).
64. Id. § 6.310.735 (2015).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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with the driver coordinator about subjects including, but not limited to,
“vehicle equipment standards; safe driving practices; the manner in which
the driver coordinator will conduct criminal background checks of all
prospective drivers; the nature and amount of payments to be made by, or
withheld from, the driver coordinator to or by the drivers; minimum hours
of work, conditions of work, and applicable rules.”68 Any agreement made
between the EDR and driver coordinator would be binding upon approval
of the Director, who would review the agreement in order “to ensure that
the substance of the agreement promotes the provision of safe, reliable,
and economical for-hire transportation services and otherwise advance[s]
the public policy goals set forth in Chapter 6.310.”69
B.

First Challenge to the Ordinance

The ride share companies did little to fight the adoption of
SMC 6.310, and it was approved by a unanimous vote of the Seattle City
Council.70 However, once the ordinance was adopted, the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce sued the City of Seattle on behalf of Uber and Eastside for
Hire, Inc., a local Seattle transportation company.71 The Chamber of
Commerce made two predictable allegations. First, that SMC 6.310 is
preempted by the National Labor Relations Act,72 which the Supreme
Court has interpreted to exclude independent contractors from collective
bargaining.73 Second, that SMC 6.310 violates and is preempted by
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which reads “a contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States . . . is illegal.”74 The Supreme
Court has interpreted Section 1 to mean that independent contractors are
forbidden from colluding on the prices they would accept for their services
or otherwise engaging in concerted anticompetitive action in the
marketplace.75
A federal district court judge for the Western District of Washington,
Judge Lasnik, dismissed the case for lack of standing on two grounds.76
First, the Chamber of Commerce was unable to show that the companies
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Alba, supra note 62.
71. See Complaint, Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. City of Seattle2016 WL 836320 (W.D.
Wash. 2016) (complaint).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935).
73. Chamber of Commerce, 2016 WL 836320 (complaint).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
75. Id.; Chamber of Commerce, 2016 WL 836320 (complaint).
76. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. City of Seattle, No. C16-0322RSL, 2016 WL 4595981
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 9, 2016) (order granting motion to dismiss).
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would sustain future injury under the provision of SMC 6.310 that allows
QDRs to acquire driver contact information from companies in order to
promote themselves to the drivers.77 The court found that Chamber of
Commerce was unable to show standing under this provision because it is
equally as likely that a QDR would use other means to market to drivers.78
Second, the court found that the companies were not injured by having to
incur certain costs as a result of the ordinance, including hiring organized
labor consultants, because companies cannot “manufacture standing
merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of
hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.”79 Ultimately, the
first challenge to Seattle’s ordinance was dismissed without prejudice.
C.

Second Challenge to the Ordinance

The Chamber of Commerce refiled its lawsuit when the City of
Seattle granted QDR status to the Teamster’s Local 117 in March 2017.80
Pursuant to Seattle’s ordinance, the establishment of a QDR meant that
Uber and Lyft, along with any other driver coordinator in Seattle, would
have had to give the Teamsters drivers’ contact information by April
2017.81 Believing the establishment of a QDR provided the requisite
standing, the Chamber of Commerce promptly refiled its lawsuit against
the City of Seattle.82 The Chamber of Commerce was joined by a separate
lawsuit from about a dozen Uber and Lyft drivers who are also opposed to
Seattle’s ordinance.83
This time, Judge Lasnik sided with the Chamber of Commerce, not
only finding that the Chamber of Commerce had standing, but also
granting a preliminary injunction against Seattle’s ordinance.84 In granting
a preliminary injunction, the court needed to find, among other factors,
that the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of the case and that the
plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm absent the preliminary relief.85 Judge
77. Id. at *4.
78. Id. at *6.
79. Id. at *4.
80. David Gutman, U.S. Chamber Sues Seattle Again, Says Uber, Lyft Taxi Drivers Can’t Form
Union, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017) [hereinafter U.S. Chamber Sues Seattle Again], http://
www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/us-chamber-sues-seattle-a-second-time-over-uber-union-law/.
81. David Gutman, Judge Temporarily Blocks Seattle Law Allowing Uber and Lyft Driver to
Unionize, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Judge Temporarily Blocks Seattle Law],
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/transportation/judge-puts-blocks-for-now-seattle-law-allowing-uber-and-lyft-drivers-to-unionize/.
82. U.S. Chamber Sues Seattle Again, supra note 80.
83. Judge Temporarily Blocks Seattle Law, supra note 81.
84. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle, No. C17-0370RSL, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 51563 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 4, 2017).
85. Id. at *3.
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Lasnik made it clear in his opinion that “this Order should not be read as
a harbinger of what the ultimate decision in this case will be.”86
Nevertheless, the Chamber of Commerce succeeded in preventing Uber
and Lyft from having to give up their driver information until the merits
of the case can be litigated.
For the time being, Seattle’s ordinance hangs in limbo. Opponents of
the Ordinance remain confident that it violates federal antitrust law. After
the court’s dismissal, the Chamber of Commerce stated that Seattle has
merely “delayed coming to grips with the legal flaws at the heart of this
ordinance.”87 On the other hand, supporters of the ordinance believe it is
legal because of the “state action doctrine” exception to federal antitrust
law.88
IV.

STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
A.

Overview

The state action doctrine—also referred to as Parker immunity—was
first established by the landmark Supreme Court case Parker v. Brown in
1943.89 In Parker, the Court upheld the California Agricultural Prorate
Act, which was enacted to limit the amount of agricultural goods produced
in California in order to “conserve the agricultural wealth of the state.”90
The Court held that “[w]e find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act
or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or
its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature.”91
Nevertheless, the Court did not articulate a clear state action doctrine test
until it decided California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n. v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc. forty years after Parker.
In Midcal, the Court created a two-prong test for determining
whether a particular private action qualifies for state action immunity.92
Under the first prong of the Midcal test, the challenged action must be
“clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy.”93 Under
the second prong of the test, the action must be actively supervised by the
state itself.94 In Midcal, the Court ultimately found that a statute that
required wine producers to set prices through a fair-trade contract in
86. Id. at *29.
87. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1014.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 34 (1943).
90. Id. at 346.
91. Id. at 350–51.
92. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
93. Id.
94. Id.
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California did not qualify for state action immunity because the program
was not actively supervised by the state.95
State action immunity is a key exception to federal antitrust law
because it permits states to pursue specific public policy objectives
without federal oversight.96 Relying on principles of federalism and state
sovereignty, the Court has consistently held that requiring states to
conform to the Sherman Antitrust Act would “impose an impermissible
burden on the States’ power to regulate.”97 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has stated that finding state action immunity is disfavored.98
B.

State Action Immunity Applied to Seattle’s Ordinance

It is unlikely that Seattle’s innovative ordinance allowing ride share
drivers to form unions would pass the Midcal test. Although the ordinance
would likely survive the second prong of the test, it is unlikely it would
pass the first prong of the test.
Seattle has the easiest argument under the second prong of the test,
which requires that the action in question must be supervised by the state.
A court would likely find that the ordinance satisfies the state supervision
requirement. The policy behind the state supervision requirement is to
ensure that a private entity does not use state action immunity to engage
in anticompetitive action in order to pursue its own interests.99 For
example, in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, the
court found that a Board of Dentists who were ordering non-dentists to
cease performing teeth whitening services were not protected by the state
action doctrine, despite being granted broad administrative powers by the
state of North Carolina.100 The Court found that there was no state
supervision in this case because the Board was made up primarily of
market participants and, as such, the Board could not meet the state
supervision requirement by supervising itself.101
Seattle’s ordinance requires that the Director of Finance and
Administrative Services be active in every aspect of the process under
SMC 6.310, including approving the designation of the QDR and EDR
and approving any agreements between the EDR and driver coordinator.102
Thus, a court would likely find that supervision by the director would

95. See id.
96. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. F.T.C., 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
97. Id. at 1109.
98. F.T.C. v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 225 (2013).
99. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1033.
100. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
101. Id.
102. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6.310.735 (2015).
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satisfy the state supervision prong if it found that the city satisfied the first
prong of the Midcal test.103
However, it is the first prong of the Midcal test that presents the
biggest hurdle for Seattle’s ordinance. The first prong of the Midcal test
requires that the challenged action be enacted in pursuit of a clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy.104 In some cases
following Midcal, the Supreme Court has seemingly relaxed the clear
articulation test to mean that the anticompetitive effect of the regulation
need only be the “foreseeable result” of what a state legislature
authorized.105 However, in a recent decision, the Court indicated that it
may be returning to the more stringent interpretation of the clear
articulation test.106
In Hallie, the Court was tasked with determining whether the City of
Eau Claire, which had the only sewage treatment facility in the area,
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by refusing sewage services to
surrounding towns unless individual landowners agreed to be annexed by
the City of Eau Claire.107 The Court found that by enacting a statute that
permitted municipalities to limit the area in which they provide sewage
services with no obligation to provide services beyond the delineated area,
the Wisconsin Legislature contemplated that a city may engage in
anticompetitive conduct.108 Therefore, the state action doctrine allowed the
City of Eau Claire to refuse service to surrounding towns unless the
individual homeowners agreed to be annexed by the City.109 Similarly, in
City of Columbia v. Omni Advertising, Inc., the Court found that state
action immunity protected the City of Columbia’s ability to enact zoning
ordinances in order to restrict new billboard construction because the very
purpose of zoning regulation is to regulate business freedom.110 In both
cases, the Court found that state action immunity applied because the
challenged actions were a foreseeable result of the legislation in question.
However, more recently, the Court seemed to return to the more
stringent interpretation of the clear articulation test. In Phoebe Putney, the
Court held that a Georgia law that created public entities called hospital
103. Judge Lasnik indicated that he did not believe the state supervision prong had not been met
by the Seattle Ordinance in his order granting the preliminary injunction. However, his analysis does
not seem to fully consider the scope of the Director’s role in approving agreements under the ordinance. See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. City of Seattle, No. C17-0370RSL, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 51563 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 4, 2017).
104. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
105. See, e.g., Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
106. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216 (2013).
107. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
108. Id. at 41–42.
109. Id.
110. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991).

2017]

Regulating the Sharing Economy

283

authorities—which had broad corporate powers, including the power to
acquire hospitals—was not sufficient to satisfy the clear articulation test
and allow the hospital authorities to engage in anticompetitive conduct.111
The intent of the law was to create organizations that would improve the
treatment of Georgia’s indigent sick.112 When the law was first enacted in
1941, the Hospital Authority of Albany-Dougherty County acquired
Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital, as was permitted under the law.113
Antitrust claims were triggered in 2010, however, when the Hospital
Authority began to contemplate acquiring the only other hospital in the
county, creating a hospital monopoly in the area.114 The Supreme Court
determined that the acquisition of the second hospital by the Hospital
Authority failed the clear articulation test and, therefore, lacked state
action immunity because “a State that has delegated such general powers
‘can hardly be said to have contemplated’ that they will be used
anticompetitively.”115 In its holding in Phoebe Putney, then, the Court
suggests that it is moving away from the more lenient “foreseeable result”
test in favor of the more stringent “clear articulation” test established by
Midcal.
In order to uphold Seattle’s ordinance, a court would have to find that
the ordinance was at least a foreseeable result of the powers granted to the
City of Seattle by the State of Washington and was at most a clearly
articulated power of the City of Seattle. The Washington statute that gives
the City of Seattle power to regulate privately operated taxicab
transportation services, including the ride share companies, allows
Washington cities to do the following:
(1) Regulat[e] entry into the business of providing taxicab
transportation services; (2) Requir[e] a license to be purchased as
a condition of operating a taxicab and the right to revoke, cancel,
or refuse to reissue a license for failure to comply with regulatory
requirements; (3) Control[] the rates charged for providing taxicab
transportation service and the manner in which rates are calculated
and collected, including the establishment of zones as the basis for
rates; (4) Regulat[e] the routes of taxicabs, including restricting
access to airports; (5) Establish[] safety, equipment, and insurance
requirements; and (6) Any other requirements adopted to ensure
safe and reliable taxicab service.116
111. Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. at 216.
112. Id. at 220.
113. Id. at 220–21.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 228 (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. WASH. REV. CODE § 81.72.210 (2016).
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Given this statutory language, it would be difficult for the City of
Seattle to argue that the Washington Legislature contemplated that Seattle
would engage in the regulation of workers in the transportation industry.
The statute clearly articulates the powers Seattle has to regulate aspects of
transportation companies’ relationships with consumers—for example,
fares, routes, and safety—but is silent as to the relationships between the
companies and their drivers. Thus, the ordinance would fail the clear
articulation test.
In the alternative, a court may analyze Seattle’s ordinance under the
slightly less stringent “foreseeable result” test. Under this test, the court
would need to determine whether Seattle’s ordinance was a foreseeable
result of the Washington statute. However, the ordinance would also likely
fail under this test because, as Judge Lasnik aptly pointed out in granting
the preliminary injunction against the City of Seattle, similar statutes
regulating the transportation industry are fairly common, but they have
never been used to regulate the relationship between the companies and
their drivers.117 Ultimately, Seattle’s ordinance would likely fail the clear
articulation prong of the Midcal test regardless of which standard a court
would use to analyze it. Thus, it is likely that Seattle’s ordinance would
not be protected under state action immunity.
This problem can easily be remedied if the Washington legislature
chooses to support Seattle by granting it the requisite power to satisfy the
clear articulation test and qualify for state action immunity. Existing case
law does not bar a state legislature from retroactively articulating that an
entity may pursue anticompetitive action. Moreover, the Seattle City
Council has already completed the difficult task of creating innovative
legislation to address one of the many regulatory concerns stemming from
the rise of the sharing economy; all that is left is for the state legislature to
follow suit.
CONCLUSION
Creating a means for drivers to collectively bargain with their driver
coordinators is only part of the battle; it is still up to the drivers to choose
to get behind an entity that will allow them to exercise their new power.
As it stands, the validity of Seattle’s innovative ordinance has yet to be
determined by federal courts. However, other cities, including New York
and Cincinnati, have taken notice of Seattle’s unique regulation, and it is
possible the regulation extending collective bargaining rights to sharing
economy workers will be seen in other cities soon.118
117. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. City of Seattle, No. C17-0370RSL, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 51563, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 4, 2017).
118. Id.
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In conclusion, one thing is certain: the sharing economy is not going
away. New and innovative companies create unique regulatory challenges
for all levels of government, to which the best response is innovative
legislation. In enacting SMC 6.310, the Seattle City Council became the
first government to come up with a creative solution to the worker
classification issues created by ride share companies like Uber and Lyft.
A court would likely find that Seattle’s ordinance violates federal antitrust
law without more support from the State of Washington. Even if the
ordinance does survive antitrust scrutiny, the creation of a new
classification of worker, which some experts suggest would be the ideal
solution,119 or a Supreme Court ruling that finds that drivers are, in fact,
employees of Uber, would be all that it takes to render Seattle’s ordinance
obsolete. Nevertheless, Seattle’s unique solution shows that all levels of
government can and should be more creative in addressing the regulatory
challenges presented by the sharing economy.

119. Kennedy, supra note 1.

